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Abstract 
U.S.-Pak relation had fluctuated wildly. America had 
formed military ally with Pakistan in 1954. U.S.-Pak 
relation was extremely close in that period. However, 
U.S.-Pak relation was very tight in some eras. America 
had issued sanctions against Pakistan because of 
the nuclear problems. U.S.-Pak relation had severe 
concussions between intimacy and alienation, extremely 
unstable. What factors led U.S.-Pak relation to so unstable 
state. This article attempts to study some factors resulting 
in the U.S.-Pak relation lacked of stability. This is very 
helpful for us to understand the U.S.-Pak relation.
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INTRODUCTION
U.S.-Pak relation fluctuated radically in the history. In the 
age of 1950-1960, America and Pakistan formed military 
allies. U.S.-Pak relation was very close in that period. 
Pakistan became the most allied ally of America in Asia. 
However, U.S.-Pak relation began to transform cold in 
the mid 1960’s. In late 1970’s, America and Pakistan 
had very sharp contradiction in nuclear development 
issue. By the end of 1979, Pakistani mobs in its capital, 
Islamabad, had ransacked and burned U.S. Embassy in 
Pakistan. U.S.-Pak relation was down to freezing point. 
Some days later, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. 
Pakistan had been the front-line state of America. U.S.-Pak 
relation rapidly warmed. America and Pakistan became 
the paramilitary allies. U.S.-Pak relation was very close in 
that period. But at the end of the 1980’s, result in Soviet 
army withdrew from Afghanistan. The U.S. and Pakistan 
immediately broke out a severe dispute due to the nuclear 
development problems. American issued sanctions on 
Pakistan. Thus, U.S.-Pak relation was very unstable. Why 
the U.S.-Pak relations showed a sharp fluctuations state? 
There are certain structural factors in U.S.-Pak relation, 
caused the radical fluctuation of U.S.-Pak relation. These 
organizational factors mainly include the following three 
points: the conflict of two countries’ national interests; 
the weak civil foundation; the asymmetry of power and 
influence.
1.  THE CONFLICT OF TWO COUNTRIES’ 
NATIONAL INTERESTS
The national interests of U.S. and Pakistan had serious 
conflict. While the U.S. focus was worldwide, Pakistan’s 
primary focus remained regional. (Kheli, 1982, p.151) U.S. 
attached great importance to the global cold war with the 
Soviet Union and China, could not back up the Pakistani 
dread against India, and also questioned the authenticity of 
Pakistani fear against India. Pakistan attached importance 
to the Indian invasion, was difficult to follow U.S. to 
contain the Soviet Union and China for a long time, and 
began to improve relations with the Soviet Union and 
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China from the early 1960’s. National interests between 
the two countries were also reflected in the orientation of 
the nuclear issue.
American formed an alliance with Pakistan. The main 
intention of America was to improve the containment 
system towards the Soviet Union and China, and to collect 
intelligence on the Soviet Union and China by using bases 
in Pakistan. U.S. only viewed Pakistan as its small partner. 
In 1963, Pakistan improved its relation with China and 
Soviet Union. When Pakistan changed the course of 
her foreign policy, the United States resented the move. 
(Chaudhri, 1970, p.52) So, U.S. Deputy Secretary of 
State George Ball warned Pakistani: “We very much hope 
President Ayub will not carry relations with Red China to 
a point where it impairs a relationship which we have.” 
(Jain, 2007, p.48)
As for the disputes between Pakistan and India, U.S. 
could know Pakistani concerns about India, but could not 
understand the feelings of Pakistan. U.S. believed that 
Pakistani concerns about India were overblown. Cause 
India did not want to take the initiative to invade Pakistan. 
President Kennedy had expressed this idea. In August 12, 
1963, President Kennedy met with the Secretary of state 
Dean Rusk and Deputy Secretary of State George Ball 
and other officials to discuss the problems of U.S.-Pak 
relation. During the meeting, President Kennedy admitted 
that he totally didn’t agree with Pakistani views about 
India: “Pakistan was not worried about the threat from 
India, but worried about the loss of ability to contend 
with India. India would not take the initiative to attack 
Pakistan, because it will cost a billion dollars in military 
expenditure.” (Smith, 1996, pp.635-639) In order to 
eliminate the concerns of Pakistan for India, Secretary of 
state Rusk suggested that the United States could provide 
a nuclear umbrella to Pakistan. But President Kennedy 
refused to adopt this proposal. President Kennedy’s 
statement had been challenged in the third Indo-Pak war. 
Because India had taken initiative to invade East Pakistan, 
did not want to lose the opportunity of dismembering 
Pakistan even it would consume a large number of 
military expenditure. In this war, Nixon and Kissinger 
claimed that vigorous American action deterred India 
from dismembering West Pakistan (Venkataramani, 1984, 
pp.397-398). In fact, except President Nixon deter India 
from invade and annex western Pakistan territory in the 
third Indo-Pak War, U.S. would never stand in Pakistan 
against India (Kux, 2001, pp.360-361).
Pakistan formed an alliance with U.S. based on the 
intention of getting the U.S. military and economic aid, 
to balance the advantages of India and protect national 
security. The former foreign minister and Prime Minister 
Muhammad Ali Bogra pointed out: “Our only objective is 
to defend the stability and security of Pakistan. Therefore, 
we need to get supports of like-minded and peace-loving 
countries. We never hide the fact that India is the number 
one threat of Pakistan.” (Sayeed, 1961, p.232) For the 
global cold war, Pakistan could not spare no effort to 
support U.S. without reservation. When Muhammad 
Ali Bogra criticized communism, he never includes 
china. During the Bandung Conference in 1955, Prime 
Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra held two meetings with 
Premier Zhou Enlai. Prime Minister Muhammad Ali 
Bogra told the Premier Zhou Enlai: The aim of Pakistan 
joined Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was not to 
against China, was only to prevent from the invasion 
of India. Pakistan would not participate in the U.S. led 
war towards china. Zhou Enlai was no doubt greatly 
impressed by Pakistani Prime Minister Muhammad 
Ali’s straightforwardness (Sherwani, 1980, p.66). China 
accepted the interpretation of Pakistan. A few days later, 
Premier Zhou Enlai pointed out at a press conference 
that China had already reached a mutual understanding 
with Pakistan. Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra 
was confirmed on the spot  (Garver, 2001, p.191).
U.S. and Pakistan had radical contradiction on 
Pakistani nuclear development problems. U.S. believed 
that Pakistani nuclear issue related to the global non-
proliferation efforts. In the beginning of 1976, the Ford 
administration strengthened the export control of sensitive 
products to some countries including Pakistan. These 
countries had not signed the “nuclear nonproliferation 
treaty”, and did not permit the international community 
to examine all of their nuclear facilities. In August 
1976, Secretary of state Kissinger visited Pakistan, tried 
to persuade Pakistan to stop its nuclear development. 
Kissinger pointed out to Ali Bhutto: the Democratic Party 
was likely to win the presidential election. Democrats 
would take more str ingent measures on nuclear 
proliferation, and are likely to punish Pakistani nuclear 
development, to deter other countries like Pakistan (Kux, 
2001, pp.221-222).
Pakistan viewed nuclear issue as a matter of national 
survival; the aim was to deter India. In 1979, U.S. 
insisted on sanctions to Pakistan on nuclear development 
(Thornton, 1982, p.967). Pakistan was very angry. What 
Made Pakistan felt most uneven is that U.S. did not punish 
India, and India had really exploded a nuclear device. Just 
like a Pakistani senior official said: 
If U.S. had imposed sanctions on India, we won’t be so minded. 
We could understand American favor Israel. It is a special case. 
But we could not understand, since U.S. refused to sanction 
India, why U.S. pressed Pakistan so severely. (Kux, 2001, p.239) 
Similarly, in 1990, U.S. imposed sanctions on Pakistan. 
What made Pakistan felt angry was that U.S. imposed 
sanctions against Pakistan, but did not impose sanctions 
on India. And India itself was the country which had 
exploded a nuclear device in 1974 (Kux, 2001, p.310).
In fact, the contradiction of Pakistan and U.S. on the 
nuclear issue highlights the contradiction of two countries’ 
national interests. U.S. was the inventor of nuclear 
Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
Why the U.S.-Pak Relation Lacked of Stability
66
weapons, also had many nuclear weapons than most of the 
countries, did not hope that more countries to hold nuclear 
weapons. But Pakistan was a country which always 
worried about Indian annexation. Pakistan engaged in 
nuclear development was to defend the national survival, 
the main objective is to balance Indian absolutely 
superiority of the national strength and the military force. 
After India had a nuclear test in 1974, Indian advantages 
to Pakistan expanded further. Pakistani fears about 
India deepened further, more unlikely to stop its nuclear 
development. As for Pakistani view, nuclear development 
issue was a life-and-death problem.
2.  THE WEAK CIVIL FOUNDATION
Civilian foundation of U.S.-Pak relation was very weak. 
This problem existed in both Pakistan and America, 
but the performances were different. Pakistan people 
generally paid great attention to America, and had a deep 
emotion to America. Such emotion was not positive, but 
was a very deep disgust. Normal American had a long-
term isolationism tradition for the rest of the world, lacked 
of interest to other countries, lacked in understanding to 
Pakistan which located in South Asia. In addition to the 
volume of trade between Pakistan and America was not 
too much, radiation crowd was not too wide. These factors 
led U.S.-Pak relation functioned more in the aspects of 
two countries’ government operation, lack of solid civilian 
foundation.
America and Pakistan were the ones which had greatly 
differences in the historical origin, ethnic composition, 
the mainstream culture and the social values and other 
aspects. Ordinary people of both Pakistan and America 
lacked of in-depth understanding of another country. 
As for America, American owing to their traditional 
isolationism, lack of interests and understanding to other 
countries. As for Pakistan which located in southern Asia, 
and the economy was not very developed, Americans 
lacked the interests to understand it. Therefore, on the 
list of countries which the American public interested in, 
Pakistan was very difficult in the forefront. (Kux, 2001, 
p.366) Americans lacked of interests of understanding 
to Pakistan, therefore lacked of in-depth understanding 
of Pakistan, so it was hard to form a solid and beneficial 
civilian foundation for the operation of U.S.-Pak relation.
In Pakistan, ordinary people generally held an awful 
impression on America. This bad impression came from 
various factors, and enhanced day by day. In the early 
years after partition, the bad impression of Pakistani 
ordinary people on America came from religious emotion. 
Because America tilt toward Israel on the Middle East 
issue, led to the bad impression of Muslim which 
including most of Pakistan. Anti-American feelings 
of Pakistan had been fully demonstrated in the critical 
moments. From 1953 to 1954, the principal mass media 
in Pakistan continued to attack the deepening U.S.-
Pak relation, opposed strongly to the U.S.-Pak military 
alliance. After the Sino-Indo border conflict in 1962, 
America provided military assistance to India. Pakistan 
emerged a lot of mass protests toward American military 
assistance to India.
Since then, disgust of Pakistani people toward 
America continued to deepen. In addition to the original 
religious emotion, Pakistani people also felt considerable 
frustration on the communication process between 
Pakistan and America. Pakistani people felt that Pakistan 
had received repeated unjust treatment by America. The 
Pakistani people had concentrated hatred and suspicion 
toward America. The Pakistani people criticized America 
for three main points: Firstly, U.S. not only refused to help 
Pakistan in the second Indo-Pak war, but also suspended 
the military assistance to Pakistan; secondly, after the 
Soviet Army withdrew from Afghanistan, America no 
longer needed joint Pakistan to fight against Soviet Union, 
and then burn the bridge after crossing it, Pakistan was 
discarded immediately; finally, on the nuclear issue, 
America had tilt toward India, and punished Pakistan. 
For the same nuclear development, America adopted 
differential treatment on Pakistan and India. America only 
implemented discriminatory sanctions against Pakistan, 
but did not punish India. 
Although on the whole, Pakistani people had a bad 
impression on America, but the elite and ordinary people 
of Pakistan had a certain difference about the impression 
of America. Administrative officer, senior officers, civil 
servants, the landlords and the managers of industry and 
commerce, held a more positive view about American. 
Although the upper members of the Pakistan Society were 
discontented with the American policy toward Pakistan, 
however, they wanted to construct better relation with 
America. In contrast, majority of Pakistani people held 
a more negative view about America. They believed 
America was not friendly or even hostile to Pakistan and 
the entire Islamic world (Kux, 2001, pp.365-366).
Because Pakistani elite and ordinary people had some 
differences on the attitude toward America, if Pakistan 
government pursued a pro America foreign policy, they 
would face resistance from the ordinary people who had 
strong anti America sentiment. Prime Minister Huseyn 
Shaheed Suhraswardy confessed: 
The alliance between Pakistan and America just like a business 
which was resolved by a few ministers in secret plan. As a 
result, this alliance was required determined from the law, but 
from the understanding of ordinary people, they did not fully 
feel this alliance is compulsory. Our commitment was made in 
secret, without public debate. This mad these obligations under 
suspicion. Ordinary people believed these obligations were 
somehow placed us in a subordinate position, and then taken 
away our autonomy. (Harrison, 1984, p.51)
America also understood there is a great difference 
between the elite and the ordinary people of Pakistan in 
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the attitude toward America. At the beginning of 1957, 
a report pointed out that the disagreement between the 
elite and the ordinary people of Pakistan in the attitude 
toward the Western alliance grew greater day by day. 
Since last one and a half years, the Western alliance 
made the ordinary Pakistani increasingly disillusioned. 
The ordinary Pakistani increasingly demanded that the 
Pakistan government pursues a more independent foreign 
policy. More serious was, the gap between the position 
of the Pakistan government and most of the Pakistani 
political awareness was widening day by day (McMahon, 
1994, p.243).
The weak civilian foundation of U.S.-Pak relation also 
derived from the economic cooperation between the two 
countries was not very deep and close. Although U.S. had 
provided Pakistan a large number of economic aid and 
loans, but the volume of trade between the two countries 
was very small. Because the personnel exchanges between 
the two countries brought by trade were not so much. 
Pakistani Influence on America economy was very small. 
So, U.S. was very difficult to emerge a powerful interest 
group canvass for the U.S.-Pak relation. It is difficult for 
the economic cooperation to provide a solid foundation 
for the U.S.-Pak relation.
3.  THE ASYMMETRY OF POWER AND 
INFLUENCE
U.S.-Pak relation had an asymmetry of power and 
influence. In other words, the influences gap of U.S. 
and Pakistan to each other was far behind the power gap 
of the two countries. American influence on Pakistan 
was not as great as its comprehensive national strength. 
And Pakistani influence on U.S. was not as small as its 
comprehensive national strength.
Although America had provided a large number of 
long term assistance to Pakistan, and as a superpower 
with very strong comprehensive national strength, but its 
influence on Pakistan was very limited. In many critical 
moments, America could not efficiently transform its 
superior military, political and economic capability into 
the influence on Pakistani policy.
In 1963, after the Sino-Indo border conflict, Pakistan 
accelerated its speed of improving relations with the 
Soviet Union and China. President Kennedy and President 
Johnson were very angry about this, and strived to put 
pressure on Pakistan for its foreign policy, trying to make 
Pakistan abandon its foreign relation improvement efforts 
with the Soviet Union and China. But Pakistan did not 
succumb to the pressure of America, did not give up 
foreign policy adjustment.
In 1965, the second Indo-Pak war broke out. America 
found that because the long-term hostility between 
Pakistan and India, despite American had provided a 
large number of assistance to Pakistan and India, but 
did not obtain the corresponding influence in these two 
countries. Finally, America could only admit, its influence 
on Pakistan and India was extremely limited. Secretary of 
State Rusk had made such comments on the second Indo-
Pak War: India and Pakistan both did not accept American 
advices (Kux, 2001, p.239).
In 1976, secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited 
Pakistan, tried to persuade Premier Ali Bhutto to abandon 
nuclear development. But Kissinger’s efforts were invalid. 
Although President Nixon tilt toward Pakistan in the third 
Indo-Pak war, and President Ford was very friendly to 
Pakistan, but American influence on Pakistan was still 
very limited (Kux, 2001, pp.223-224). After the Premier 
Ali Bhutto was deposed by a military coup, America still 
failed to exert much influence on Pakistan.  Under the 
great American pressure, Pakistan continued to promote 
the nuclear development, and ultimately produced nuclear 
weapons.
The reasons why America lacked influence on Pakistan 
was mainly due to U.S. and Pakistan had different ideas 
on the following issue, what policy would be the best one 
for Pakistan and its national security. U.S. and Pakistan 
had the greatest difference on the opinion about India. 
In 1963, secretary of state Rusk said: “Pakistani fear, 
suspicion and hate to India mean, we could not expect that 
Pakistan would act rationally according to our plan and 
the most advantageous way to their national interests.” 
(Smith, 1996, pp.575-577)  Even in today, Rusk’s this idea 
still was correct. When Pakistan was in trouble, it would 
act in their own way, rather than America approach to 
pursuit of their national interests, even if it means losing a 
large number of American military and economic aid (Kux, 
2001, p.363).
Although Pakistan was a poor country in the marginal 
areas, but its influence on America was more significant 
than its national strength. When Pakistan was American 
ally, Pakistan could have a certain degree influence on 
America, and thus gain more national interests.
At the end of 1950s’, Pakistan launched a continuous 
game with America on whether to provide Pakistan 
with F-104 fighters. Finally America promised Pakistan 
to provide F-104 fighters. After 3 years intense game 
between Pakistan and America, the need for Pakistan was 
met by America. Pakistan, an underdeveloped country in 
the third world had been equipped with F-104, a kind of 
advanced fighter which even American NATO allies had 
not equipped at that time.
On July 9, 1963, Pakistan Ambassador to U.S. Aziz 
Ahmed frankly exchanged with President Kennedy. 
Aziz Ahmed criticized America for its providing India 
with military assistance, and pointed out that it would 
endanger the national security of Pakistan. President 
Kennedy told Aziz Ahmed, it is difficult to accept the 
ambassador’s criticism, and pointed out that: “U.S. had 
fully considered the national interests of Pakistan. In 
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fact, the amount of aid I provide to India compare to the 
amount I want to provide had been reduced a lot!” (Smith, 
1996, pp.617-619)
CONCLUSION
Today, although U.S. and Pakistan had become quasi 
ally again, but U.S.-Pak relation still had very dramatic 
changes. The U.S.- Pak relation improved slightly in the 
early years of the Clinton presidency. In 1998, Pakistan 
had followed the footstep of India, carried through 
Pakistani nuclear tests. This led American sanctions 
on Pakistan. In 1999, Kargil clashes and military coup 
launched by General Musharraf, led U.S.-Pak relation hit 
bottom. In 2001, 911 events brought tremendous impetus 
to the improvement of U.S.-Pak relation. Pakistan had 
cooperated with America on the anti terror war. America 
and Pakistan once again became quasi military ally. In 
recent years, U.S. had doubted about the role and effect of 
Pakistan in the war on terror, and had adjusted its strategy 
of the war on terror. So, U.S.-Pak relation once again 
came into the subtle transition period. Regardless of the 
fact that the stability of U.S.-Pak relation had improved 
slightly, but it still had very dramatic changes. In the 
foreseeable future, structural factors which caused U.S.-
Pak relation full of changes would not alter. The U.S.-Pak 
relation would still be in a dynamic state for a very long 
time.
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